LICENSING AND WELFARE REDUCING COMPETITION

This paper shows that technology licensing may be socially undesirable. Possibility of licensing increases the incentive for entry and thus, increases competition. If technology of the incumbent and entrant is sufficiently close, licensing-induced entry reduces social welfare. Otherwise, licensing always increases welfare...

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Year of publication:	2003-12-01
Authors:	Mukherjee, Arijit ; Mukherjee, Soma
Institutions:	University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Subject:	Technologie \| technology \| Wettbewerb \| market microstructure \| Lizenzvergabe \| Beitritt \| Wohlfahrt \| Welfarism

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Extent:	268288 bytes 17 p. application/pdf
Series:	The University of Nottingham / School of Economics - discussion papers Discussion PaperNo. 03/22
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1360-2438
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues ; Corporate growth, plant size and choice of location ; Market research ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868809