Licensing contracts : control rights, options, and timing
Year of publication: |
April 2017
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Authors: | Crama, Pascale ; De Reyck, Bert ; Taneri, Niyazi |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 63.2017, 4, p. 1131-1149
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Subject: | research and development | innovation | contract design | moral hazard | Vertrag | Contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Lizenz | Licence | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Innovation | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Innovationsmanagement | Innovation management | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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