Licensing innovations : the case of the inside patent holder

Cuihong Fan; Byoung Heon Jun; Elmar G. Wolfstetter

The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators’ licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost reduction, and even negative royalty rates.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Fan, Cuihong ; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	Innovation \| licensing \| industrial organization \| Patent \| Lizenz \| Licence \| Industrieökonomik \| Industrial organization \| Theorie \| Theory \| Immaterialgüterrechte \| Intellectual property rights

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (6 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 510
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF-Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/121362 [Handle]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285324