Health insurance status can change over the life cycle for exogenous reasons (e.g. Medicare for the elders, PPACA for younger agents, termination of coverage at retirement in employer-provided plans). Durability of the health capital, endogenous mortality and morbidity, as well as backward induction suggests that these changes should affect the dynamic life cycle beyond the period at which theyoccur. The purpose of this paper is to study these lifetime effects on the optimal allocation (consumption, leisure, health expenditures), status (health, wealth and survival rates), and welfare. We analyse the impact of young (resp. old) insurance status conditional on old (resp. young) coverage through the structural estimation of a dynamic model with endogenous death and sickness risks. Our resultsshow that young insurees are healthier, wealthier, consume more health care yet are less exposed to OOP risks, and substitute less (more) leisure before (after) retirement. Old insurees show similar patterns, except for lower precautionary wealth balances. Compulsory health insurance is unambiguously optimal for elders, and for young agents, except early in the life cycle. We draw other implicationsfor public policy such as Medicare and PPACA.
