LOSS AVERSION AND THE TULLOCK PARADOX

We show that the presence of loss aversion on the part of participantsin a Tullock imperfectly discriminating contest will significantlyreduce the proportion of the rent dissipated in the form of resourcesused up in the competition for that rent...

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Year of publication:	2003-09-26
Authors:	Cornes, Richard ; Hartley, Roger E.
Institutions:	University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics ; University <Keele> / Department of Economics and Management Science
Published in:	The University of Nottingham / School of Economics - discussion papers Discussion PaperNo. 03/17
Subject:	Wettbewerb \| market microstructure \| Aversion \| Rent Seeking \| rent seeking \| Proportion \| proportion

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Extent:	301056 bytes 27 p. application/pdf
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1360-2438
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; Corporate growth, plant size and choice of location ; Study of commerce ; Individual Reports, Studies ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868814