Macroeconomic policy during a transition to monetary union

The main conclusions of the paper are the following: - In order to minimize switching costs, the name of the new EU currency should be the D-mark - Differential national requirements for seigniorage revenue provide a weak case for retaining national monetary independence. - From the point of view of adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. - Inter-state labour mobility in the USA does not compensate for the absence of state-level exchange rate flexibility. - The absence of significant inter-member fiscal redistribution mechanisms in the EU is not an obstacle to monetary union. - Convergence or divergence in real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. - A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted international mobility of financial capital. - The Maastricht criteria are unlikely to hinder monetary union. - There are no convincing economic objections left to monetary union in the EU.