Manipulation in group argument evaluation.

Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needs to reach a common po- sition on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. This problem has been recently investigated in [1]. In this paper, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Podlaszewski, Mikolaj ; Pigozzi, Gabriella ; Caminada, Martin
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine
Subject:	Collective decision making \| Argumentation \| Judgment aggregation \| Social choice theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C44 - Statistical Decision Theory; Operations Research ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009370232