Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

Geoffroy de Clippel; Rene Saran; Roberto Serrano

We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents best-respond to their belief that other agents have at most k

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	De Clippel, Geoffroy ; Saran, Rene ; Serrano, Roberto
Publisher:	[Providence, RI : Brown Univ., Dep. of Economics]
Subject:	mechanism design \| bounded rationality \| level k reasoning \| small modeling mistakes \| incentive compatibility \| continuity \| Begrenzte Rationalität \| Bounded rationality \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (36 S.)
Series:	Working papers / Brown University, Department of Economics. - Providence, RI : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2185003-3. - Vol. 2014-7]
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/145419 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721