Mergers in a Cournot Setting : Profitability and Welfare

Us Merger Guidelines consider that the anticompetitive effects of a horizontal merger is increasing in the initial market concentration and decreasing in the elasticity of demand. These ideas are studied in a setting where identical firms compete à la Cournot and marginal cost is constant. The first relationship holds if demand is convex and the second if the elasticity of demand is a good proxy for the degree of concavity.

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Year of publication:	1995-12-01
Authors:	Fauli-Oller, Ramon
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain

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Series:	Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Number 1995032 2 pages long
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985261