Migration and the Welfare State : Dynamic Political-Economy Theory

We model an overlapping-generations economy with two skill levels: skilled and unskilled. The welfare-state is modeled simply by a proportional tax on labor income to finance a demogrant in a balanced-budget manner. Therefore, some (the unskilled workers and old retirees) are net beneficiaries from the welfare state and others (the skilled workers) are net contributors to it.Migration policies are set to determine the total migration volume and its skill composition. We characterize subgame-perfect Markov political-economic equilibria consisting of the tax rate (which determines the demogrant), skill composition and the total number of migrants. We distinguish between two voting behaviors: sincere and strategic voting

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Razin, Assaf
Other Persons:	Sadka, Efraim (contributor) ; Suwankiri, Ben (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Sozialstaat \| Welfare state \| Theorie \| Theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Umlageverfahren \| Pay-as-you-go \| Einwanderung \| Immigration \| Migrationspolitik \| Immigration policy \| Einwanderungsrecht \| Immigration law \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Finanzierung der Sozialversicherung \| Social security financing \| Qualifikation \| Occupational qualification \| Arbeitsmigranten \| Migrant workers

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (33 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 2991
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1577582 [DOI]
Classification:	H00 - Public Economics. General ; F20 - International Factor Movements and International Business. General ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146334