Minimax Regret and Efficient BargainingUnder Uncertainty

Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that thereare several possible states of nature, each of which is identied with abargaining problem...

Authors:	Bossert, Walter ; Peters, Hans
Institutions:	University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| game theory \| Unsicherheit \| Kovarianz <Stochastik> \| covariance structure \| Tarifverhandlung \| bargaining \| Reue \| absolute regret

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Extent:	130048 bytes 12 p. application/pdf
Series:	The University of Nottingham / School of Economics - discussion papers Discussion Paper ; 98/08
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Specific management methods ; Market research ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

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