Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Hendrickx, Ruud ; Thijssen, Jacco ; Borm, Peter
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 73.2012, 3, p. 441-451
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Minimum cost spanning tree problems \| Transferable utility games \| Spillovers

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010865837