Minimum participation rules with heterogeneous countries

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Weikard, Hans-Peter ; Wangler, Leo ; Freytag, Andreas
Publisher:	Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Subject:	Umweltabkommen \| Mitgliedschaft \| Finanzierung \| Partizipation \| Internationale Umweltpolitik \| Koalition \| Theorie \| Welt \| Minimum participation rules \| international environmental agreements \| coalition formation \| transboundary pollution \| environmental policy coordination

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Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2009,077
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	610119591 [GVK] hdl:10419/32554 [Handle]
Classification:	D62 - Externalities ; H41 - Public Goods ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330092