Moral fictionalism, preference moralizationand anti-conservatism: why metaethicalerror theory doesn’t imply policy quietism

The evolutionary explanation of human dispositions to prosocial behaviour and tomoralization of such behaviour undermines the moral realist's belief in objectivemoral facts that hold independently of people's contingent desires. At the same time,advocacy of preferences for significant departures from hallowed policies (that is, for'loud policies') is generally sure to be ineffective unless it is moralized. It may seemthat this requires the economist who would advocate loud policies, but is alsocommitted to a naturalistic account of human social and cognitive behaviour, toengage in wilful manipulation, morally hectoring people even when she knows thather doing so ought rationally to carry no persuasive force. Furthermore, it might bewondered on what basis just for herself an error theorist about morality advocatesloud policies. I argue that understanding the role of moralized preferences in themaintenance of the self, and in turn understanding the economic rationale of such selfmaintenance,allows us to see how and why preferences can be moralized by abeliever in error theory without this implying hypocrisy or manipulation of others...