Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power

We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework whereparties are risk-neutral and the agent is ¯nancially constrained. Weshow that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining poweris analyzed in either of the following three frameworks; a standard P-Aframework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternatingo®er game and in a generalized Nash bargaining game

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Year of publication:	2003-11-01
Authors:	Demougin, Dominique ; Helm, Carsten
Publisher:	Universität <Berlin, Humboldt-Universität> / Institut für Organisationstheorie
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Agency-Theorie \| Verhandlungstheorie

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Extent:	158720 bytes 9 p. application/pdf
Series:	Humboldt-Universität <Berlin> / Walther-Rathenau-Institut für Organisationstheorie - Publikationen
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D2 - Production and Organizations ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Theory of organisation ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844235