Moral hazard contracts: does one size fit all?

Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents' productivities. Firms' practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a one-size-fits-all approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Koch, Alexander K. ; Peyrache, Eloïc
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 2463
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	538378174 [GVK] hdl:10419/33899 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267875