Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers the first-score auction.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Liu, Shulin ; Li, Jun ; Liu, De
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 3, p. 408-411
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Procurement auctions \| Multi-attribute auctions \| Risk aversion

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; H57 - Procurement ; L50 - Regulation and Industrial Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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