Multilateral Non-Cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007-09
Authors:	Vartiainen, Hannu ; Kultti, Klaus
Institutions:	Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu, Turun Yliopisto
Subject:	multilateral \| bargaining \| general utility set

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers. - ISSN 1796-3133.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 19 2 pages long
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537241