Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
Alessandro Agnetis; Cyril Briand; Jean-Charles Billaut; Přemysl Šůcha
| Year of publication: |
2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Agnetis, Alessandro ; Briand, Cyril ; Billaut, Jean-Charles ; Šůcha, Přemysl |
| Published in: |
Journal of scheduling. - New York, NY : Springer Science + Business Media LLC, ISSN 1094-6136, ZDB-ID 1492486-9. - Vol. 18.2015, 1, p. 15-27
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| Subject: | Multi-agent project scheduling | Nash equilibria | Flow networks | Scheduling-Verfahren | Scheduling problem | Theorie | Theory | Projektmanagement | Project management | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Durchlaufzeit | Lead time | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482003