Nash Equilibrium and Buyer Rationing Rules: Experimental Evidence.
Laboratory experiments compare the results of two different buyer rationing rules on Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly markets. The two rationing rules, a value queue and a random queue, specify the ordering of buyers and generate different predictions under otherwise identical conditions. These experiments show market outcome can change significantly with a change in the ordering of buyers. The direction of these changes agrees with the predictions of the stage-game Nash equilibrium. Thus, the single-shot Nash equilibrium is shown to have predictive power even in repeated games. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Brown-Kruse, Jamie |
Published in: |
Economic Inquiry. - Western Economic Association International - WEAI. - Vol. 31.1993, 4, p. 631-46
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Publisher: |
Western Economic Association International - WEAI |
Saved in:
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