Networks with group counterproposals

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Nieva, Ricardo
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Efficiency \| Bargaining Protocol \| Counterproposals \| Network Formation \| Transfers \| Externalities \| Groups \| Coalitions

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 61.2008
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	643904263 [GVK] hdl:10419/53302 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279529