No information sharing in oligopoly: The case of price competition with cost uncertainty

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Hornig, Stephan ; Stadler, Manfred
Publisher:	Tübingen : Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	Oligopol \| Preiswettbewerb \| Produktionskosten \| Unvollkommene Information \| Spieltheorie \| Informationsverhalten \| Theorie \| Reaktionsverbundenheit

More details

Series:	Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; 194
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	57562065X [GVK] hdl:10419/47564 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:tuedps:194 [RePEc]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305054