No-regret dynamics and fictitious play

Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Viossat, Yannick ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 148.2013, 2, p. 825-842
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Regret minimization \| No-regret strategy \| Fictitious play \| Best-reply dynamics \| Nash equilibrium \| Hannan set \| Curb set

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042930