Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals

We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.

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Year of publication:	2010-03
Authors:	Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Garcia-Gallego, Aurora ; Georgantzis, Nikolaos ; Montesano, Aldo
Institutions:	Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Subject:	Bargaining \| Confirmed proposals \| Confirmed agreement

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	TSE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series TSE Working Paper Number 10-192
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672300