Non-horizontal mergers with investments into compatibility

We set up a model to analyze the effects of mergers between sellers of complementary components where firms invest in compatibility and can engage in bundling. We consider the impact of merger on prices, investment and consumer surplus. We also analyse when the merged firm may have an incentive and ability to foreclose rivals.

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Langus, Gregor ; Lipatov, Vilen ; Padilla, Jorge
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	mergers \| complementary goods \| welfare effects \| foreclosure \| compatibility

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 7617
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1665092475 [GVK] hdl:10419/198977 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_7617 [RePEc]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018308