Noncompete Agreements, Training, and Wage Competition

We study the effects of noncompete contracts in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer-provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare

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Year of publication:	[2022]
Authors:	Shy, Oz ; Stenbacka, Rune
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Betriebliches Bildungsmanagement \| Employer-provided training \| Lohn \| Wages \| Wettbewerbsverbot \| Noncompete agreement \| Qualifikation \| Occupational qualification \| Wettbewerb \| Competition

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 4, 2022 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4000688 [DOI]
Classification:	J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; K31 - Labor Law ; L4 - Antitrust Policy ; M53 - Training
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013309425