Norm elicitation in within-subject designs : testing for order effects

Giovanna D'Adda, Michalis Drouvelis, Daniele Nosenzo

We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	D'Adda, Giovanna ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Nosenzo, Daniele
Publisher:	Nottingham : CEDEX
Subject:	social norms \| norm elicitation \| order effects \| within-subject design \| corruption \| bribe game \| Experiment \| Korruption \| Corruption \| Soziale Norm \| Social norm

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (27 S.) Ill., graph. Darst.
Series:	CEDEX discussion paper series. - Nottingham : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1749-3293, ZDB-ID 2105636-5. - Vol. 2015-02
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/129820 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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