Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient

We examine how diversification of projects assigned to an agency can enhance efficiency by informing a principal of the agency’s quality. Projects that appear inefficient in isolation may be justified when assigned to the same agency. Assigning different tasks to different special purpose governments, though allowing for technical efficiency in the management of each project, may nevertheless reduce overall efficiency.

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Year of publication:	2008-06
Authors:	Glazer, Amihai ; Proost, Stef
Institutions:	Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen
Subject:	Special purpose governments \| Asymmetric information \| Bureaucracy \| Project evaluation

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Series:	Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; H43 - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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