On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	CHRISTIAN, Robin ; FELLOWS, Mike ; ROSAMOND, Frances
Institutions:	Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal
Subject:	lobbying \| referendum \| rametrized comexity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	6 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545709