On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

Shao Chin Sung; Dinko Dimitrov

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive. -- Additivity ; Coalition formation ; Core ; Co-NP completeness ; Hedonic games

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2005
Other Persons:	Sung, Shao Chin (contributor) ; Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor)
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Inst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW
Subject:	Core \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Hedonischer Preisindex \| Hedonic price index \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game

Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 9 S., 408 KB)
Series:	Working papers / Universität Bielefeld, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW). - Bielefeld : IMW, ISSN 2942-9536, ZDB-ID 2437810-0. - Vol. 374
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/43763 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C63 - Computational Techniques
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731608