On core stability and extendability

This paper investigates conditions under which the core of a TU cooperative game is stable. In particular the author extends the idea of extendability to find new conditions under which the core is stable. It is also shown that these new conditions are not necessary for core stability.

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Year of publication:	2007-01
Authors:	Shellshear, Evan
Institutions:	Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld
Subject:	core stability \| stable core \| extendability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 387 37 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812800