On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good

We study the effciency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, equal cost sharing is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-budgetdecit mechanisms only when there are 2 agents. In general the equal cost

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Massó, Jordi ; Nicoloó, Antonio ; Sharma, Tridib ; Ülkü, Levent
Institutions:	Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Departamento Académico de Economía
Subject:	Excludable public good \| Equal cost sharing \| Maximal welfare loss

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1306 33 pages
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781650