On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects

We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Albano, Gian Luigi ; Germano, Fabrizio ; Lovo, Stefano
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Signalling \| Kartell \| Theorie \| Multi-unit auctions \| ascending auctions \| FCC auctions

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 62.2001
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/155225 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608824