On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation : the case of non-linear utilities

Alexey Kushnir; Shuo Liu

We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Kushnir, Alexey ; Liu, Shuo
Publisher:	Zurich : Univ., Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Bayesian implementation \| dominant strategy implementation \| mechanism design \| non-linear utilities \| single-crossing \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Bayes-Statistik \| Bayesian inference \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	Online-Ressource (22 S.)
Series:	Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics. - Zurich : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1664-705X, ZDB-ID 2625625-3. - Vol. 212
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5167/uzh-115786 [DOI] hdl:10419/126591 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389528