On the Evolution of Organizational Government

This paper analyzes the design, refinement, and evolution of organizationalpolicymaking processes, that is to say, organizational governance. Governance procedureslike other aspects of organization are refined through time to advance formeteurinterests. Several mechanisms of evolution are explored in this paper. First, formal organizationshave a beginning. They are founded. As a consequence, governance templatesinitially tend to maximize formeteur control over their organizations. Second, formeteursmay subsequently revise the initial distribution of authority. There are oftengood reasons for formeteurs to exchange some of their initial authority for services andresources that advance organizational interests. Third, there are the constraints of survivorship,which require an organization to attract sufficient resources to be self sustaining.This paper suggests that the results of these processes of refinement tend to be ruledriven,divided governments, many of which will be based on the king and council template.That template facilitates the emergence of relatively effective forms of organizationalgovernance, because it can be adjusted at a large number of margins withoutchanging the essential architecture of governance.