On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players’ perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize’s material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and the behavior induced by evolutionarily stable preferences.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Boudreau, James W. ; Shunda, Nicholas
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 116.2012, 3, p. 498-501
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Contest \| Prize valuation \| Preference evolution \| Evolutionarily stable preferences

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594163