On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable strategies.

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Year of publication:	2010-08-25
Authors:	Boudreau, James W. ; Shunda, Nicholas

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Boudreau, James W. and Shunda, Nicholas (2010): On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests.
Classification:	D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222884