On the Optimal Use of Correlated Information in Contractual Design Under Limited Liability
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Danau, Daniel |
Other Persons: | Vinella, Annalisa (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Haftung | Liability |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (47 p) |
---|---|
Series: | CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 6974 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 19, 2018 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3190980 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability
Danau, Daniel, (2018)
-
Optimal information revelation by informed investors
Strausz, Roland, (2005)
-
Informationally Simple Incentives
Gleyze, Simon, (2020)
- More ...
-
Public-Private Contracting under Limited Commitment
Martimort, David, (2015)
-
From fixed to state-dependent duration in public-private contracts
Danau, Daniel, (2013)
-
Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability
Danau, Daniel, (2010)
- More ...