On the overconfidence-effect in teams

This paper analyses the effects of overconfidence on a coordination problem within a team of two agents and in the presence of effort complementarities. We show that in several settings an overconfidence bias or the mere anticipation of having an overconfident partner might not only help mitigate the coordination problem but also result in a Pareto improvement.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Wickhorst, Hanke
Publisher:	Münster : Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Organisationsökonomik
Subject:	Gruppenarbeit \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Verhaltensökonomik \| Bias \| Pareto-Optimum

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Series:	Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik ; 3/2010
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	642371156 [GVK] hdl:10419/45033 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:umiodp:32010 [RePEc]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D62 - Externalities ; L23 - Organization of Production
Source:	EconStor

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