On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
Benjamin Brooks, Songzi Du
| Year of publication: |
2024
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Brooks, Ben ; Du, Songzi |
| Subject: | Bayes correlated equilibrium | information design | max-min | Mechanism design | optimal auctions | public expenditure | robustness | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics |
freely available
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/ECTA20240 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015117828