On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Janssen, M.C.W. ; Maasland, E.
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	Separating equilibria \| signalling games \| Stackelberg competition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 1997-106
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091500