On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets

We analyze the use of information in a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. To sustain collusion, insurance companies might refrain from changing their pricing schedules even if new information about risks becomes available. We therefore provide an explanation for the existence of unused observables that is information which

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Kesternich, Iris ; Schumacher, Heiner
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	repeated games \| insurance markets \| oligopoly \| unused observables

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 280
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13274 [DOI] 615085806 [GVK] hdl:10419/94102 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:280 [RePEc]
Classification:	G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334079