OPTIMAL BUNCHINGWITHOUT OPTIMAL CONTROL

This paper presents simple su±cient conditions under which optimal bunches inadverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal controltheory.

Year of publication:	2006-01-17
Authors:	Nöldeke, Georg ; Samuelson, Larry
Institutions:	Universität <Bonn> / Abteilung für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; University of Wisconsin <Madison, Wis.> / Department of Economics ; Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum <Basel>
Subject:	Kontrolle \| Wirtschaftskooperation \| economic cooperation \| coopération économique \| Bunching \| bunching \| Zuordnung

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Extent:	214016 bytes 24 p. application/pdf
Series:	Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum <Basel> - discussion paper
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; Strategic management ; Specific management methods ; Financial theory ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

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