Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Auster, Sarah ; Pavoni, Nicola |
Publisher: |
Bonn and Cologne : University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI) |
Subject: | Asymmetrische Information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Signalling | Spieltheorie |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1745301135 [GVK] hdl:10419/228862 [Handle] RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:059 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: |
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