Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
Subir K. Chakrabarti, Jaesoo Kim
| Year of publication: |
2023
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| Authors: | Chakrabarti, Subir K. ; Kim, Jaesoo |
| Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-7187, ZDB-ID 1478916-4. - Vol. 94.2023, 3, p. 379-404
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| Subject: | Adverse selection | Games with incomplete information | Optimal contracts with commitment | Optimal contracts with no commitment | Perfect Bayesian equilibrium | Pooling contracts | Separating contracts | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Adverse Selektion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s11238-022-09894-9 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014291646