Optimal Mechanism Design without Money

We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We first establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes. We then use this equivalence to construct the constrained-efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner.

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Year of publication:	2013-04-10
Authors:	Gershkov, Alex ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Shi, Xianwen
Institutions:	University of Toronto, Department of Economics
Subject:	Mechanism Design \| Dominant Strategy Implementation \| Median Voter Schemes \| Social Choice

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Unknown pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850121