Optimal Redistributive Pensions and the Cost of Self-Control

We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influence the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals’ welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e. not saving, or saving less) is attractive. We show that proportional taxation increases the cost of self-control, and that this adverse effect is more acute when public pensions become more redistributive.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	St-Amant, Pier-André Bouchard ; Garon, Jean-Denis
Institutions:	Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Économiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE)
Subject:	Taxation \| Redistribution \| Pensions \| Self-control

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752083