Optimal wage redistribution in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market

Spencer Bastani; Tomer Blumkin; Luca Micheletto

In this paper we allude to a novel role played by the non-linear income tax system in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. We show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Bastani, Spencer ; Blumḳin, Tomer ; Micheletto, Luca
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	adverse selection \| labor market \| optimal taxation \| pooling, redistribution \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Theorie \| Theory \| Umverteilung \| Redistribution \| Optimale Besteuerung \| Optimal taxation \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market \| Lohn \| Wages \| Lohnsteuer \| Wage tax \| Arbeitsangebot \| Labour supply

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (17 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 4938
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/102095 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010391779