Overconfidence and Tax Avoidance : The Role of CEO and CFO Interaction

We investigate how top executives' overconfidence may influence firms' tax reporting behavior and the role of CEO and CFO interaction in this relationship. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs, and utilize multiple measure to identify companies' tax avoidance behavior. We find that companies with overconfident CEOs (CFOs) are more likely to engage in tax avoidance activities, relative to firms with non-overconfident CEOs (CFOs). We also document an interaction effect showing that companies with overconfident CEOs are more likely to engage in tax avoidance activities when these companies also have overconfident CFOs, relative to those with non-overconfident CFOs. Our results suggest that CFOs, as CEOs' business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs' decisions on tax avoidance. Our study helps investors and regulators understand companies' decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance