Partially-Specified Large Games

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully speci?ed. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More- over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi- anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.

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Year of publication:	2005-09
Authors:	Kalai, Ehud
Institutions:	Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management
Subject:	Nash equilibrium \| ex-post Nash \| structural robustness \| metagames

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 1403
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252417